Melbourne, Apr 29: Australia has proposed taxing digital giants Meta, Google and TikTok a proportion of their revenue to pay for news reporters.

The government released draft legislation Tuesday it intends to introduce to Parliament by July 2 that would create a financial incentive for the social media companies to strike deals with news organisations to pay for journalism.

The platforms’ criticisms included that the proposal was a “digital services tax” that misunderstood the evolving advertising industry and would fail to deliver a sustainable news sector.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said a monetary value needed to be attached to journalists’ work.

“It shouldn’t just be able to be taken by a large multinational corporation and used to generate profits for that organisation with no compensation appropriate for the people who produce that creative content,” Albanese told reporters.

“We think that investment in journalism is critical to a healthy democracy,” he added.

It’s Australia’s second legislative attempt to make the platforms pay for the Australian news text and images that their users view.

Digital platforms had been pressured to strike deals with Australian news publishers to pay for journalism by legislation passed in 2021 that created the country’s News Media Bargaining Code.

The platforms chose to reach commercial deals with news creators rather than be forced into arbitration and have a judge set the price.

But they have since avoided renewing those deals by removing news from their services.

The proposed News Bargaining Incentive would charge major platforms that choose not to strike commercial deals with news publishers a 2.25 per cent tax on their Australian revenue.

The platforms would be given offsets and their overall costs would be lowered if they agree to pay publishers for journalism, the government said.

The government expects the incentive would raise between 200 to 250 million Australian dollars (USD 144 million- USD 179 million) a year. That was about as much as the platforms paid news outlets when the News Media Bargaining Code was working at its peak.

The government would distribute that income among news organisations based on how many journalists each organisation employed, Communication Minister Anika Wells said.

The tax would apply to Meta Platforms, which owns Facebook and Instagram, Google, which is owned by Alphabet Inc., and TikTok, which is majority-owned by US-backed investors.

Opposing the proposed legislation, Meta said news organisations “voluntarily post content on our platforms because they receive value from doing so.”

“The idea that we take their news content is simply wrong. This proposed legislation, which would apply to platforms regardless of whether news content even appears on our services, is nothing more than a digital services tax,” Meta said in a statement.

“A government-mandated transfer of wealth from one industry to another, with no connection to the value exchanged, will not deliver a sustainable or innovative news sector. Instead, it will create a news industry dependent on a government-administered subsidy scheme,” Meta added.

Google said “we reject the need for this tax.”

“It ignores the fact that Google already has commercial agreements with the news industry, misunderstands how the ad market changed and mandates payments from some companies while arbitrarily excluding platforms like Microsoft, Snapchat and OpenAI — despite the major shift in how people consume news,” a Google statement said.

TikTok did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

All the targeted platforms are American. US critics have argued that Australia’s News Media Bargaining Code had disproportionately cost American corporations.

Albanese was not concerned by potential pushback from the United States.

“We’re a sovereign nation and my government will make decisions based upon the Australian national interest,” Albanese said.

Canberra, Apr 29: US President Donald Trump is quickly approaching a deadline to wrap up his war against Iran – or he’ll be in breach of US law.

Under the 1973 War Powers Resolution, a US president can only launch a war without congressional approval for 60 days. After that, Congress either has to declare or authorise the war – or the president must end the operations.

Even though there is currently a ceasefire between the US and Iran, the resolution would still apply to the naval troops and ships responsible for maintaining the US blockade of Iranian ports.

So, what happens if the 60-day deadline passes and Trump refuses to pull out?

What is the War Powers Resolution?

The War Powers Resolution was passed by Congress over then-President Richard Nixon’s veto in November 1973. It was a major piece of legislation designed to curb presidential usurpation of the congressional power to declare war. It came just after the withdrawal of US troops from the Vietnam War, which had not been authorised by Congress.

The law hasn’t been very successful since its passage because of its loose legal language, the numerous exceptions and qualifications, and the large number of loopholes that presidents and their advisers have discovered.

Certainly, no president since Nixon has been significantly constrained by the law. Those who have initiated conflicts without congressional approval have paid little more than lip service to its provisions.

Congress has also contributed to the failure of the War Powers Resolution through its reluctance to defend its constitutional and statutory rights to declare war.

Notwithstanding its past ineffectiveness, it may be premature to write off the War Powers Resolution in the current conflict. The main reason: it provides a mechanism for wary Republican lawmakers to try to bring an end to an unpopular war.

What does the law say?

The statutory end-date for the war comes into effect by way of two sections of the War Powers Resolution.

Under section 4, the president is required to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours of introducing US troops into “hostilities” and explain the constitutional and legislative authority under which the action was taken, the justification for the action, and the estimated scope and duration of the US involvement.

This triggers a 60-day clock under section 5 of the law. If Congress has not declared or authorised the war by then – or extended the deadline – the president must end the military action.

The beauty of this provision, at least as far as members of Congress are concerned, is that it is automatic. Legislators don’t have to do anything to implement it. And because no vote is necessary, they don’t have to go on record opposing the president’s military and national security policy.

Trump submitted his report on the war with Iran on March 2, which means the 60-day deadline expires on May 1.

So far, Congress has not responded by declaring or authorising the war, though Republicans have blocked numerous Democratic legislative efforts to end the war or constrain Trump’s ability to act without congressional approval.

Congress also has the option of extending the 60-day limit for a maximum of 30 days. This would require a vote in both the House and Senate.

Republicans are growing uneasy

The major difference between this war against Iran and other wars of recent US presidents is that this one is going extremely badly for Trump.

A new poll by Reuters and Ipsos this week found that just 34 per cent of Americans support the US conflict with Iran.

This time, there has been no “rally-around-the-flag” effect supporting Trump’s military incursion. Members of Congress, ultra-sensitive to their constituents’ opinion, are not running scared of opposing Trump on this issue, either. Many would be risking electoral backlash by going on the record in support of the war.

Republican Senator John Curtis of Utah, for example, has written an essay saying he will not support the war after the 60-day deadline passes without congressional approval. Other Republicans have echoed his sentiments.

Given his general contempt for the Constitution and statute law, Trump will probably disregard the legal mandate to withdraw US troops. He is more likely to claim that the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional, as Nixon did when he vetoed it in 1973. As such, he may seek to challenge the law through the courts.

So, what happens if Trump does ignore the deadline? This depends on how members of Congress react. Democrats are reportedly exploring a lawsuit against the administration, though this has proven difficult to do in the past.

Trump could also claim the law doesn’t apply because US forces are not currently engaged in direct hostilities in Iran, as then-President Barack Obama did when the 60-day clock lapsed during the US military operations in Libya in 2011.

When Trump sent formal notification to Congress on March 2, he made a point of saying he was acting under his “constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive”, neither of which give him the power to commit the US to war without congressional approval.

He did not acknowledge the War Powers Resolution except to say that his report was “consistent with” it – a standard form of wording used by his predecessors who have all demonstrated some reluctance to adhere to its provisions.

In the past, when presidents and Congress have clashed over the War Powers Resolution, they have usually reached some accommodation, but it has depended on the circumstances and often favours the president.

This time it could be different. Trump is badly managing an unpopular war with wafer-thin majorities in Congress, six months out from the midterm election.

If US troops are still engaged in the Middle East on May 1, the War Powers Resolution could take on a relevance it hasn’t had for more than 50 years. 

The decision by the United Arab Emirates to walk out of OPEC and the broader OPEC+ after nearly six decades is being read not merely as an energy policy shift, but as a direct consequence of the ongoing war in West Asia, more so the ongoing crisis of Strait of Hormuz, which has destabilised oil flows, fractured producer unity and accelerated a reordering of global energy alliances.

The announcement comes against the backdrop of a severe supply disruption triggered by conflict in the region, with the World Bank warning of the largest oil supply shock on record. Shipping through the critical Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly a fifth of the world’s oil passes, has been severely affected, pushing up energy prices and rattling global markets.

For decades, OPEC functioned as a cartel balancing supply to stabilise prices. But the current war, drawing in regional powers and disrupting trade routes, has exposed the limits of coordinated production cuts, creating further divide and in the long term more competition.
The UAE’s exit also reflects a growing divergence within the grouping. Abu Dhabi, which has invested billions to ramp up oil production capacity, increasingly found itself constrained by OPEC quotas at a time when supply shortages have driven prices higher.
Energy analysts in one of the BBC articles say the war has forced oil producers into a stark choice: defend price stability through coordinated restraint, or maximise output to capitalise on supply gaps. The UAE has chosen the latter, as most analysts feel that ongoing conflict conditions in West Asia can reward producers who can act quickly and independently.

The departure is widely seen as a structural blow to OPEC. The UAE accounts for a major share of spare production capacity and has historically been among the more compliant members of the cartel. Its exit leaves Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s de facto leader, with a heavier burden to stabilise markets. International media and the analysts warn that Riyadh will need to do a little more to enforce discipline among remaining members, especially amid widening geopolitical divides involving Iran and Russia.
Some experts have gone further, calling the move “the beginning of the end” for OPEC as a cohesive force. The risk is contagion: if other producers follow suit, the cartel’s ability to influence prices could erode rapidly, ushering in a more fragmented and volatile oil market.

Washington’s win
The shift also carries clear geopolitical hints. Donald Trump has repeatedly criticised OPEC for keeping oil prices artificially high and had pressed Gulf producers to increase output.
The UAE’s decision is finally going to benefit Washington and its long-standing demand for lower oil prices and more flexible production. It also opens the door for closer strategic alignment between Abu Dhabi and the United States at a time when global energy security has become deeply entangled with geopolitics.
Market implications: lower prices, higher volatility In the short term, the war-induced disruption, especially around the Strait of Hormuz, means the UAE’s exit may not immediately translate into increased supply. But over the longer term, the country is expected to significantly boost production, potentially adding up to one million barrels per day. This could exert downward pressure on prices. 

Without a strong, unified OPEC, oil markets could swing more sharply in response to geopolitical shocks, supply disruptions or unilateral production decisions.
The UAE’s relatively low cost of oil production, far below many peers gives it an advantage in such an environment. It can afford to pump more even when prices fall, prioritising market share over price control.

India watches closely
For India, the world’s third-largest oil importer, the developments carry mixed implications. On one hand, increased production outside cartel constraints could help moderate prices over time, offering relief to inflation and the current account.
On the other, heightened volatility amid geopolitical tensions could complicate energy planning, disrupt supply chains and expose India to sudden price spikes, particularly if instability in the Strait of Hormuz persists.

New Delhi has already been diversifying its energy sources and building strategic reserves, but the evolving crisis highlights the vulnerability of import-dependent economies to distant conflicts that can perhaps bring a new energy order. 

The UAE’s exit is symbolic of a broader transformation as described by one of the news analyst, the erosion of old alliances and the emergence of a more fluid, competitive energy landscape shaped by geopolitics as much as economics.
As current war redraws fault lines in West Asia, oil is once again at the centre of global power politics. And with OPEC’s cohesion under strain, the rules that governed energy markets for decades may be giving way to a more unpredictable era.